How friendship links and group memberships affect the privacy of individuals in social networks by Zheleva, Elena & Getoor, Lise
How friendship links and group memberships
affect the privacy of individuals in social networks
Elena Zheleva, Lise Getoor
Department of Computer Science




In order to address privacy concerns, many social media websites allow
users to hide their personal profiles from the public. In this work, we show
how an adversary can exploit a social network with a mixture of public
and private user profiles to predict the private attributes of users. We map
this problem to a relational classification problem and we propose a simple
yet powerful model that uses group features and group memberships of
users to perform multi-value classification. We compare its efficacy against
several other classification approaches. Our results show that even in the
case when there is an option for making profile attributes private, if links
and group affiliations are known, users’ privacy in social networks may
be compromised. On a dataset from a well-known social-media website,
we could easily recover the sensitive attributes for half of the private-
profile users with a high accuracy when as much as half of the profiles
are private. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that uses
link-based and group-based classification to study privacy implications in
social networks. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and the
broader applicability of our proposed model.
1 Introduction
A number of social media and social network websites, such as Facebook, Orkut
and Flickr, allow their participants to set the privacy level of their online pro-
files and to disclose either some or none of the attributes in their profiles. Not
surprisingly, some users are more open to sharing personal information than
others and they disclose more attributes on their profiles. For example, some
people feel comfortable displaying personal attributes such as age, political affil-
iation or location, while others do not. Most social-media users utilize the social
network underlying the service by forming friendship links and affiliating with
groups of interest. While a person’s profile may remain private, the friendship
links and group affiliations are often visible to the public. Unfortunately, these
friendships and affiliations leak information; in fact, as we will show, they can
leak a surpisingly large amount of information.
Being able to control who learns their personal information is an important
aspect for users who agree to participate in online social networks. For that
reason, most social media websites allow users to hide their profiles from the
general public. However, we think it is also important to be able to hide friend-
ship lists and group memberships to ensure that they do not imply something
that users did not intend to disclose. For example, in Facebook many users
choose to set their profiles to private, so that noone but their friends can see
their profile details. Yet, fewer people hide their friendship lists and even if
they do, theis friendship links can be found through the backlinks from their
public-profile friends. Similarly with groups – even if a user hides his profile,
his participation in a public group is shown on the group’s membership list.
In order to ensure the privacy level that users desires, it is important that the
users are aware of the privacy breaches that their friendship links and group
participation entails. It is also important that the social media website provider
protects its users against undesired eavesdropping by informing them of the
possible privacy breaches and providing them the means to be in full control of
their private data.
The problem we consider is sensitive attribute inference in social networks:
inferring the private information of users given a social network in which some
profiles are public and all links and group memberships are exposed. To the
best of our knowledge, our work is the first one to look at this problem, to map
it to a classification problem in network data with groups. More concretely, the
data that we consider consists of entities that have links among each other and
participate in groups together. The classes of some entities are known (public
profiles), and the classes of the rest need to be inferred (private profiles). The
entities are assumed to have no other attributes except the class value.
Here, we propose five classification models for inferring the sensitive at-
tribute. The first simple baseline method ignores link and group information.
Two of the models are link-based classification models; one considers aggregates
over the friends of the user and the second one builds upon an idea borrowed
from stochastic blockmodeling, that user interactions can be explained by the
clusters to which they belong. The fourth model is group-based classification, an
approach which takes into consideration the class values of entities that partici-
pate in the same groups as the object we are trying to classify. Our group-based
classification model contains two main parts. First, it selects the groups that are
relevant to the classification task. Next, it uses the groups as entity features: it
classifies the entities by training a classifier based on the observed, public-profile
information, and using it to predict unobserved, private attribute values. The
fifth model is a simpler version of the group-based classification in which all the
available groups in the classification process.
We evaluate the models on multi-value and binary classification tasks using
sample datasets from three well-known social media websites - Flickr, Dogster
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and BibSonomy1. Our results show that the group-based classification achieves
significantly better accuracy than the models that ignore the group information.
Our contributions include the following:
• We identify a number of novel privacy attacks in social networks with a
mixture of public and private profiles
• We propose a general framework for group-based node classification in
social networks with a large number of affiliation groups
• We show that automatic reduction of the large number of groups and
using only the ones that are relevant to the classification task at hand is
beneficial
• We show the privacy implications of publicly affiliating with groups in
social networks and discuss how our study affects anonymization of social
networks
• We evaluate our group-based classification approach on hard classification
tasks in three social media datasets
Our results show that even in the case when there is an option for making
profile attributes private, if links and group affiliations are known, users’ privacy
in social networks is illusionary at best.
2 Preliminaries
Predictive modeling in network data usually relies either on supervised or un-
supervised learning. In the last decade, there has been a growing interest in
supervised classification that relies not only on the object attributes but also on
the attributes of the objects it is linked to, some of which may be unobserved
[10, 14, 13]. Link-based classification (also known as relational or collective
classification) in network data, such as social networks, relies on autocorrela-
tion, the property that makes the classes of linked objects correlated with each
other. For example, political affiliations of friends tend to be similar, a person
communicating with criminals may be a criminal, etc.
The goal of unsupervised learning or clustering is to group objects together
based on their similarity. In social networks, clusters can be found based on
attribute and/or structural information. For example, Neville and Jensen [13]
describe how autocorrelation in relational data is sometimes caused by the pres-
ence of such hidden clusters or groups in the data which influence the attributes
of the group members. They use a spectral clustering method based on node
links in the data to discover groups, and then use the groups to classify the
nodes. Unlike other clustering methods for relational data, their method as-
sumes that groups do not overlap. Airoldi et al. [2] study mixed-membership
1At http://www.flickr.com, http://www.dogster.com and http://www.bibsonomy.org/
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clustering of relational data to predict protein function. It is assumed that the
cluster assignment is related to the node attribute value in question.
In contrast to these approaches, we are interested in classifying nodes when
group membership is explicitly given and only a subset of the groups is related
to the node attribute in question. This is different from the case where groups
need to be detected because explicit groups can represent a latent common
interest that neither attribute nor structural information contains. We propose
a node classification method that makes use of explicit groupings with member-
set overlaps, and it distinguishes groups that are relevant to classification based
on group features such as name, size, link density, homogeneity, etc.
2.1 Motivation
By participating in a social network, people are vulnerable to disclosing personal
data they may have not intended to disclose because some network members are
more open to sharing their personal information than others. Our work shows
that even if users are very conservative in displaying personal information, the
relationships they form and the groups they join can help an adversary infer
personal information that they may not have intended to disclose.
According to Li et. al. [6], there are two types of privacy attacks in data:
identity disclosure and attribute disclosure, and identity disclosure often leads
to attribute disclosure. Identity disclosure occurs when the adversary is able
to determine the mapping from a record to a specific real-world entity (e.g. an
individual). Attribute disclosure occurs when an adversary is able to determine
the value of a user attribute that the user intended to stay private.
Until recently, the literature on privacy preservation considered only single-
table data, in which the rows represent i.i.d. records, and the columns repre-
sent record attributes [1, 4, 6, 9, 12, 15]. Real-world data is often relational,
and records may be related to one another or to records from other tables.
Relational data poses new challenges to preserving the privacy of individuals
[3, 5, 8, 11, 18]. For example, in graph data, there is a third type of disclosure
attack: link re-identification [18]. Link re-identification is the problem of infer-
ring that two entities participate in a particular type of sensitive relationship
or communication. If one anonymizes the data näıvely by removing personal
attributes and replacing them with a random identifier, it still is possible to
identify individuals based on their subgraph structure [3, 5, 8]. It is also pos-
sible to link records in anonymized data to external relational data sources to
disclose attribute values [11]. Our work is complementary in that we assume
that the identities of people are known but the value of the sensitive attribute
of some of them is not directly available. We propose several simple models for
inferring the hidden sensitive attributes using the observed attributes, link and
group information in a single data source.
All the privacy attacks mentioned above are meant to show that more so-
phisticated anonymization techniques are necessary. It is important to be aware
of the different possible privacy attacks in order to guide these anonymization
techniques. The challenge of anonymizing graph data lies in understanding the
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Figure 1: Toy instance of the data model.
rich dependencies in the data and removing sensitive information which can be
inferred by direct or indirect means. Here, we show an attribute-disclosure at-
tack in data which is meant to be partially private. We look at the attribute
disclosure problem as a classification problem and we use friendship links, group
affiliation and public attribute values as its features.
Based on the group-based privacy attack, we identify a fourth type of pri-
vacy breach in relational data, group membership disclosure: whether a person
affiliates with a group relevant to a sensitive-attribute classification. We con-
jecture that hiding group memberships is important in preserving the privacy
of individuals and their personal data. A group membership disclosure can lead
to an attribute disclosure.
3 Data model
We represent the relational data as a graph G = (V,E, H), where V is a set of
n nodes of the same type, E is a set of directed edges, and H is a set of groups
that a node can belong to. ei,j ∈ E represents a relationship between the nodes
vi and vj . We describe a group as a hyper-edge h ∈ H among all the nodes who
belong to that group; h.U denotes the set of users who are connected through
hyper-edge h and v.H denotes the groups that node v belongs to. Similarly,
v.F is the set of nodes that v has connected to: vi.F = {vj |∃ei,j ∈ E}. A group
can have a set of properties h.T .
We assume that each node v has a sensitive attribute which is either observed
or hidden in the data. A sensitive attribute is a personal attribute, such as age,
political affiliation or location, which some users in the social network are willing
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to disclose publicly while others keep private. A sensitive attribute value can
take on one of a set of possible values {a1...am}. A user profile has a unique id
with which the user forms online relationships and participates in groups. Each
profile is associated with a sensitive attribute, either observed or hidden. Based
on that, there are two types of profiles: private and public. A private profile is
one for which the sensitive attribute value is unknown, and a public profile is
the opposite: a profile with an observed sensitive attribute value. We refer to
the set of nodes with private profiles as the sensitive set of nodes Vs, and to the
rest as the observed set Vo. The adversary’s goal is to predict Vs, the sensitive
attributes of the private profiles.
A group of users has a distribution over the observed sensitive attribute
values, and this is the information one can use to predict the sensitive attribute
values of the users whose values are unobserved. We are interested in the case
where nodes have no other attributes except the sensitive attribute because
when a user profile is private, no attributes are available for that user. This
case is different from a traditional classification case where a classifier depends
on the other attributes of the node. Without attributes, it is not be possible to
train a standard classifier such as Näıve Bayes or logistic regression to predict
the sensitive attribute using other attributes of the same node. Therefore, the
algorithm has to rely on links, groups and domain knowledge.
As a running example network, we consider the social network presented
in Figure 1 which contains the friendship network and the groups of interest.
Chris, Don, Emma and Fabio are displaying their attribute values publicly,
while Ana, Bob and Gia are keeping theirs private. Emma and Chris have the
same sensitive attribute value. Users are linked by a friendship link, and in this
example they are reciprocal. There are two groups that users can participate in:
the ”Espresso lovers” group and the ”Yucatan” group. While affiliating with
some groups may be related to the sensitive attribute, affiliating with others is
not. For example, if the sensitive attribute is a person’s country of origin, the
”Yucatan” group may be relevant. Ideally, we would like to be able to reason
about these probabilistically.
4 Private-attribute inference models
Online communities allow very diverse people to connect to each other and form
relationships that transcend gender, religion, origin and other boundaries. As
this happens, it seems harder to utilize the complex interactions in online so-
cial networks for predicting user attributes because the correlation of friends’
attributes does not necessarily hold. Attribute disclosure occurs when the ad-
versary is able to infer the sensitive attribute of a real-world entity accurately.
An individual’s attribute value could be looked at as a representative of the
social network attribute distribution, as well as a representative of its friendship
network attribute distribution, or a representative of each group that he or
she belongs to. The basic intuition behind the models we present is that the
sensitive-attribute distributions of the group and friendship circles of a person
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are more informative about his/her sensitive attribute than the overall sensitive-
attribute distribution.
The problem of sensitive attribute prediction is to infer the hidden sensitive
values Vs.A conditioned on the observed sensitive attribute values, links and
group membership in graph G. We assume that the adversary can apply a
probabilistic model F for predicting the hidden sensitive attribute values, and
he can combine the given graph information in various ways as we discuss next.




where PF (vs.ai;G) is the probability that the sensitive attribute value of node
v is ai according to model F and the observed part of graph G.
4.1 Privacy attack in the absence of links and groups
In the absence of relationships and groups, we assume that the given information
for an individual is the overall dataset distribution of the sensitive value. This
approach uses the distribution of values in the nodes. More formally, according
to the model based on node information FV , the probability of a sensitive at-
tribute value can be estimated as the fraction of observed users who have that
sensitive attribute value:




The adversary using model FVo picks the most probable attribute value
which in this case is the overall mode of the multinomial attribute distribution.
In our toy example, the adversary would predict that Ana, Bob and Gia have
the same attribute value as Chris and Emma. One problem with this approach
is that if there is a sensitive attribute value that is predominant in the observed
data, it will be predicted for all users with private profiles. Next, we look at
using friendship information for inferring the attribute value.
4.2 Privacy attacks using links
Link-based models take advantage of autocorrelation, the property that the
attribute values of linked objects are correlated. One example of autocorrelation
is people who are friends sharing some of the same personal features. This relates
to the proverb found in many cultures ”Tell me who your friends are, and I’ll tell
you who you are.” Our link-based setup considers network data which consists
of linked nodes which have no other attributes besides the class label. Figure 2
(b) shows a graphical representation of the link-based classification model.
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of the models. Grayed areas correspond to
variables that are ignored in the model.
4.2.1 Friend-aggregate model
The nodes and their links give a graph structure in which one can identify circles
of close friends. For example, the circle of Bob’s friends, is the set of users that
he has links to: Bob.F = {Ana,Chris, Emma,Fabio}. The friend-aggregate
model makes use of autocorrelation, and looks at the sensitive attribute dis-
tribution amongst the friends of the person under question. According to the
model based on node and link information FV,E , the probability of the sensitive
attribute value can be estimated by:
PFV,E (vs.ai;G) = P (vs.ai|Vo.A,E) =
|V ′o .a|
|V ′o |
where V ′o = {vo ∈ Vo|∃(vo, vs) ∈ E}.
Again, the adversary using model FV,E picks the most probable attribute
value (i.e., the mode of the friends’ attribute distribution). This model is sim-
ilar to the weighted-vote relational-neighbor procedure with unweighed edges
described in [10]. In our toy example (Figure 1), Bob would pick the same value
as Emma and Chris, Ana the same label as Don, and Gia will be undecided
between Don’s, Emma’s and Fabio’s label. One problem with this method is
that if the class distribution is skewed, then highly-represented class labels may
take over the predicted labels. Another problem is the one in which a person’s
friends are very diverse, as is Gia’s case.
4.2.2 Blockmodeling-based model
The basic idea behind stochastic blockmodeling is that users form natural clus-
ters or blocks, and their interactions can be explained by the blocks they belong
to [17, 2]. In particular, the link probability between two users is the same as
the link probability between their corresponding blocks. If sensitive attribute
values separate users in blocks, then based on the observed interactions of a
private-profile user with public-profile users, one can predict the most likely
block that the user belongs to and thus discover the attribute value. Let block
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Bai denote the set of public-profile users who have attribute value a, and λi,j
the probability that a link exists between users in block i and users in block j.
Thus, λi is the vector of all link probabilities between block i and each block
B1, ..., Bm. Similarly, let the probability of a link between a single user v and
a block j be λ(v)j with λ(v) being the vector of link probabilities between v
and each block. To find the probability that a private-profile user belongs to a
particular block, the model looks at the maximum similarity between the inter-
action patterns (link probability to each block) of the node in question and the
overall interactions between blocks. After finding the most likely block, the sen-
sitive attribute value is predicted. The probability of an attribute value using
the blockmodeling-based model FB is estimated by :




where sim() could be any vector similarity function and Z is a normalization
factor. We compute maximum similarity using the minimum L2 value. This
model is similar to the class-distribution relational classifier described in [10]
when the weight of each directed edge is inversely proportionate to the size of
the class of the receiving node.
4.3 Privacy attack using group memberships
Social networks offer a very rich structure through the group memberships of
users. Groups offer a broad perspective on a person, and it may be possible to
use the group affiliations in order to achieve better classification. All individuals
in a group are bound together by some observed or hidden interest that they
share. One can think of groupmates as users to whom one is implicitly linked
to and again apply the idea of autocorrelation.
If a user belongs to only one group (as it is Gia’s case in the toy example),
then it is straightforward to use the aggregate, e.g., the mode, of her group-
mates’ labels, similar to the friend-aggregate model to assign a label to her.
This problem becomes more complex when there are multiple groups that a
user belongs to, and their distributions suggest different values for the sensitive
attribute. Moreover, some of the groups may be irrelevant to the classification
task at hand and ideally, we would like to discard them. For example, the group
”Yucatan” may be relevant for finding where a person is from but ”Espresso
lovers” may not be.
A group is either relevant to the classification task at hand or not. To
select the relevant groups, one can apply standard feature selection criteria
[7]. If there are N groups, the number of candidate group subsets is 2N , and
finding an optimal feature subset is intractable. Similar to pruning words in
document classification, one can prune groups based on their properties and
evaluate their predictive accuracy. Example group properties include density,
size, homogeneity. Smaller groups may be more predictive than large groups,
and groups with high homogeneity may be more predictive of the class value.
9
For example, if the classification task is to predict the country that people are
from, cultural groups may be more relevant to this task. A group which is more
homogeneous in relation to the class labels of its members is more likely to be
relevant. For example, a group in which 90% of the people are from the same
country is more likely to be predictive of the country class label. One way to
measure group homogeneity is by computing the entropy of the group. A group
h can be looked at as a discrete random variable that can take on the possible





where m is the number of possible node class values and p(ai) is the fraction of





For example, the group ”Yucatan” has an entropy of 0 because only one
attribute value is represented there, therefore its homogeneity is very high. An-
other group property is the percent of public profiles in it. This shows how
confident we are in the computed group entropy which is estimated based on
the public profiles.
In the most basic case, group features are ignored and all groups are consid-
ered to be relevant to the classification task. This case can be used as a straw
man to check whether selecting groups based on their relevance is worthwhile.
Algorithm 1 Group-based classification model
1: Set of relevant groups Hrelevant = ∅
2: for each group h ∈ H do
3: if isRelevant(h) then




8: for each sensitive node v ∈ Vs do
9: v.â = f(v.Hrelevant)
10: end for
The group-based classification approach contains three main steps as Algo-
rithm 1 shows. In the first step, the algorithm performs feature selection: it
selects the groups that are relevant to the node classification task. This can
either be done automatically or by a domain expert. Ideally, when the number
of groups is high, the feature selection should be automated. For example, the
function isRelevant(h) can return true if the entropy of group h is low. In the
second step, the algorithm learns a global function f , e.g., trains a classifier,
that takes the relevant groups of a node as features and returns the node class
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value. This step uses only the nodes from the observed set because their sensi-
tive attributes are known. Each node v is represented as a binary vector where
each dimension corresponds to a unique group: {groupId : isMember}, v.a.
Only memberships to relevant groups that v belongs to are considered and
v.a is the class coming from a multinomial distribution which denotes the
sensitive-attribute value. In the third step, the classifier returns the predicted
sensitive attribute for each private profile. Figure 2 (b) shows a graphical rep-
resentation of the group-based classification model.
5 Experiments
We evaluated each of the proposed models and assessed their accuracies. For the
group models, we used an implementation of SVM with multi-value classification
[16].
5.1 Data description
For our data experiments, we look at three diverse online communities, namely
the photo-sharing website Flickr, the dog online social network Dogster and
the social bookmarking system BibSonomy. For Flickr, we concentrated on the
problem of predicting the country of a person from 55 possible values. For
Dogster, we predicted the breed group of each dog from 7 possible values. We
also experimented with a publicly available dataset from the social bookmarking
system Bibsonomy, and we performed binary classification to detect malicious
behaviour, i.e., whether a user is a spammer or not.
Flickr is a photo-sharing community in which users can display their pho-
tographs, comment on other users’ photos, create directed friendship links, form
and participate in groups of common interest. Users have the choice of provid-
ing personal information on their profiles, such as gender, marital status and
location. We collected a snowball sample of 14, 451 users from it. To resolve the
location attributes (which users enter manually, as opposed to choosing them
from a list), we used a two-step process. In the first step, we used Google Maps
API2 to find and unify the latitude and longitude of each user location. In the
second step, we mapped the latitude and longitude back to a country location
using the reverse-geocoding capabilities of GeoNames3. At the end, 34% of the
users had no resolved country location. We considered only the users from coun-
tries which had at least 10 representatives. The sample contained people from
55 countries. There were 9179 users, 47754 groups with at least 2 members,
941677 directed links and 1486689 group memberships. The largest group has
4527 users.
Dogster is a pet social networking website where dog owners can create pro-
files describing their dogs, and to post and share information that includes pho-




Figure 3: The group size in our Flickr sample follows a power-law distribution.
The long tail is not shown on the figure. The maximum group size is 4527.
Members also maintain links to dog friends and family members. Our second
dataset contains a random sample of 10,000 instances from Dogster. The dogs
that do not participate in any groups were removed from the sample. The re-
maining 2, 632 dogs participate in 1042 groups with at least two members each.
Each dog has a breed such as golden retriever or beagle. Each breed belongs
to a broader type set. In our dataset, there were mostly toy dogs (749). The
other major breed categories were working (268), herding (202), terrier (232),
sporting (308), non-sporting (225), hound (152) and mixed dogs (506).
The third dataset is publicly available from the ECML PKDD 2008 Discov-
ery Challenge website4. It contains data from the social bookmarking website
BibSonomy, in which users can tag bookmarks and publications. Even though
BibSonomy allows users to join groups of interest, the dataset did not contain
this information. Therefore, we consider each tag placed by a person to be a
group that a user belongs to. We considered tag instances for both bookmarks
and publications, and converted them all to lower case. There are no links be-
tween users other than the group links. There are 31715 users with at least one
tag, 98.7% of which posted the same tag with at least one other user. We used
the data for a spam filtering task, considering that the sensitive attribute that
spammer users would be interested to hide is the binary attribute of whether
someone is a spammer or not.
5.2 Experimental setup
We ran experiments for each of the five presented attack models: an attack
in the absence of link and group information (baseline model), the link-based
friend-aggregate attack and blockmodeling-based attack, the group-based attack
in which relevant groups are selected and its simpler version which considers
all groups. For the first three models, we ran leave-one-out experiments which
assume that complete information is given in the network in order to predict the
sensitive-attribute of a user. For the group-based approaches we split the data
into test and training by randomly assigning each profile to be private with
4At http://www.kde.cs.uni-kassel.de/ws/rsdc08/.
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a probability n%, i.e., assuming n% private profiles in the network. Groups
were marked as relevant to the classification task either based on maximum size
cutoff, maximum entropy cutoff and/or minimum percent of public profiles in
the group. We measure accuracy, node coverage and group coverage. Accuracy
is the correct classification rate, node coverage is the portion of private profiles
for which we can find the sensitive attribute, and group coverage is the portion
of groups used for classification. The reported results are the averages over 5
different trials for each set of parameters.
5.3 Sensitive-attribute inference results
5.3.1 Flickr
In the absence of link and group information, our baseline achieved a very low,
27.7%, accuracy due to the fact that there was a large class skew: 27.7% of the
users are from the United States. The link-based methods in the presence of
complete information performed even worse. Using the majority rule on friends’
attribute values, the accuracy was 25.7%. This may be due to the diversity of
friends and/or the class skew. Using the blockmodeling-based attack performed
even worse, with only 8% accuracy. Clearly, Flickr users do not form friendships
based on their country of origin and the country of origin of their friends.
The group results were more promising. We tried a large variety of values
for each parameter: percent private profiles in the network, maximum size cut-
off, maximum entropy cutoff, and minimum percent of public profiles in the
group. Here, we report on the ones that provided more insight in terms of high
accuracy and node coverage. Figure 4 (a) shows that naively running the clas-
sifier on all group memberships, the prediction accuracy was 63.5%. However
choosing the relevant groups based on their size made the accuracy go up to
72.1%. This showed that medium to small-sized groups were more informative.
Choosing the relevant groups based on their entropy showed even better results
(see Figure 4 (b) with the best cutoff being around 0.5. Using the groups with
entropy lower than 0.5 resulted in 83% accuracy. The reported results are for
groups with a minimum of 50% public profiles per group. We also experimented
with groups with more or less public profiles and the results are presented in
Figure 4 (c). When homogeneous groups include at least 90% of public users per
group, the accuracy went to 100% but only for a very small set of 1 − 3 users.
Including groups, regardless of the percent public profiles per group, yielded
a lower accuracy but over a larger set of users. Other advantages of choosing
relevant groups based on entropy were that it reduced the group space by 71.2%
and that SVM was able to train much faster. The disadvantage is that as we
prune groups, some of the users do not belong to any groups, thus the coverage
over nodes is lower: 52% of the nodes were predicted with 83.3% accuracy. For
privacy purposes, this is a strong result, and it means that groups can help
an adversary predict the sensitive attribute for half of the users with private
profiles with a high accuracy. Figure 4 (d) shows what would happen if there
were more users with private profiles in the network. As expected, when there
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Figure 4: Prediction accuracy on the Flickr dataset when there are 50% private
profiles and the relevant groups are chosen based on (a) varying size, (b) vary-
ing entropy, and (c) a varying minimum requirement for the number of public
profiles per group with a maximum entropy cutoff point at 0.5. Accuracy for
various percent of public profiles (d): the more the private profiles in a network,
the worse the accuracy and therefore, the better the privacy of users.
are more private profiles, the accuracy is worse and therefore, users’ privacy is
better preserved. When there are mostly public profiles, the accuracy can go as
high up to 84 − 88%. Even in the case of mostly private profiles, the accuracy
is relatively high considering the baseline of 27.7%. The reported results are for
the case when the minimum portion of public profiles per group is equal to the
portion in the overall network and the cutoff for the maximum group entropy
is at 0.5.
Looking at the most and least relevant groups provided some interesting
insights. The most heterogeneous group, i.e., the one with the highest entropy
that our method found is called ”worldwidewondering - a travel atlas”, and it
includes photos and discussion of countries from all over the world. As its name
suggests, it pertains to users from different countries and using it to predict
someone’s country seems useless. Some of the larger homogeneous groups in-
clude ”Beautiful NC”, ”Disegni e scritte sui muri” and ”Nederland belicht.” One
of the homogeneous groups has the nondescript name ”ponx”, and it includes
users from the same country. For example, for one user we looked at, member-
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Figure 5: Prediction accuracy on (a) Dogster and (b) BibSonomy.
ships in this group and another homogeneous groups helped us determine that
a user who claimed to be from all over the world was most likely from Mexico.
The content of his pictures on Flickr confirmed this as well.
5.3.2 Dogster
In Dogster, the baseline accuracy in the absence of groups and links is 28.6%.
Including all groups as features led to 66.6% accuracy when there were 50%
public profiles, and it had very high coverage over nodes (92.2%). Pruning
groups based on entropy led to much higher accuracy (88.9%) but had lower
coverage over nodes (14.9%). Figure 5 (a) shows the accuracy and percent
covered nodes for various percent private profile assumptions. We tried different
options for the maximum group entropy required, and we report on the results
for 0.5. The accuracy increased significantly as the number of public profiles
in the network increased with one exception: the accuracies for 70% and 90%
public profiles did not have a statistically significant difference. A group named
”All Fur Fun” was the least homogeneous of all groups, i.e., had the highest
group entropy of 2.7. The online profile of the group shows that this is a
group that invites all dogs to party together, so it is not surprising that dogs of
many different breeds join. The larger homogeneous groups included ”Boxers
International,” ”Westies Unite” and ”German Shepherds World.”
5.3.3 BibSonomy
We used the BibSonomy data to see whether the group-based classification ap-
proach can also help in detecting malicious behavior in a social-media website.
The binary attribute we were trying to predict was isSpammer. There is a
large class skew in the data: most of the labeled user profiles are spammer
profiles and the baseline accuracy in the absence of links and groups is 92.2%.
Using all groups when 50% of the profiles are public to a statistically signifi-
cant improvement in the accuracy (94.1%) and a very good coverage over users
(98.5%), almost all users with tags that at least one other user uses (98.7%).
The accuracy results for BibSonomy are presented in Figure 5 ((b). We tried
15
different options for the minimum entropy required, and we report on the re-
sults for it being 0. The results suggest that if more profiles are labeled, then
more covered spammers would be caught. As in the other results, the cover-
age gets lower as this happens which in the spam case is actually undesirable.
Precision was 99.9− 100% in all group-based classification cases, meaning that
virtually all predicted spammers were such, whereas in the baseline case, it is
92.2%. Some of the homogeneous tags with many taggers include ”mortgage”
and ”refinance.”
6 Discussion
From a general data mining perspective, our results suggest that it is possible
to predict the attributes of some users with hidden profiles and create better
statistics of the attribute’s overall distribution. For example, if a marketing
company can predict the age and location of users with hidden profiles, it can
make its targeted marketing much better. As groups with higher entropy are
added, the uncertainty associated with the attribute prediction gets higher,
and it gets harder to utilize the existence of diverse groups for node attribute
prediction. The results also suggest that it is possible to get valuable data from
social media websites, and rather than discarding all the private profiles, it is
possible to label some of them with reasonable attribute values and use the data
to test data-mining and machine-learning algorithms.
From a privacy perspective, this means that joining more diverse groups
preserves privacy better. Therefore, people who are truly concerned about their
privacy should consider factors such as homogeneity of the groups they join. Of
course, in dynamically-evolving environments, it is harder to assess whether a
group will remain diverse as more people join and leave it. Another aspect is
the ability to join public groups but display their group memberships only to
people they feel comfortable with. For example, social media websites could
allow their users to hide their group membership from people who are not their
friends. From a data anonymization perspective, our results suggest that a data
provider should consider removing groups that are homogeneous in respect to
sensitive attributes before publishing a dataset in the public domain.
Other interesting research questions remain to be answered: What are the
properties that make a social network vulnerable to a group-based attack? Are
profiles on social media websites more or less vulnerable than ones on a purely
networking website? What are the specific privacy guidelines that a social net-
work website provider should follow to ensure its users are protected against un-
intended privacy leaks? Do users with private profiles have group-membership




While having a private profile is a good idea for the privacy-concerned users,
their links to other people and affiliations with public groups pose a threat on
their privacy. In this work, we showed how one can exploit a social network
with mixed profiles to predict the sensitive attributes of users. Using group
information, we were able to discover the sensitive attribute values of some
users with high accuracy on three real-world social-media datasets.
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